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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD E. ASHBY 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
\JVHITING & HAYMOND CON-
STRUCTION COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
The statement of facts as contained in the Appellant'R 
Brief does not coincide with the evidence, and especially 
~btements which the Appellant in his Brief contends are 
umhsputed are at variance with the real facts. of the_ case, 
and for that reason Respondent makes~ the following_: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Highway U-100, also known as First North Street in 
Fillmore, Utah, is and was a State Road running in an 
east-\vest direction through Fillmore City in Millard Coun-
ty (tr. 9) .. That Se-:ond West ·street in Fillmore runs. in 
a north-south direction and interse:cts with Highway_ U-100 
(Firsf.Norlh. Sti.-eet) .. That ata1l-tfmes pribr to. the co:itr..:· 
meP.cement of construction and improvement of the road · 
at this intersection by Whiting Haymond Construction 
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2. 
Company on about September 1st, 1960, a stop sign on 
the- -northwest corner of the intersection and a ·stop sign 
011 the· southeast corner of the intersection had controlled 
traffic going either south or north on Second West Street 
and which intersected U-100. Five witnesses, Eugene 
Ashby, Maxim Thornton, Everett Ashman, Gayle Rasmus-
sen and Merlin Hare, testified as to these stop signs which 
controlled the traffic, as being in place to the time of con-
struction work (T 39, 65, 66, 77, 84, 105). 
That about 6 ·:30 P.M. on Saturday, October 29, 1960. 
the plaintiff and respondent was driving e·ast in his Chev-
rolet pickup along U-100. (T 9) Respondent was travel-
ling approximately 20 miles per hour. As he apprnached 
the intersection of Second West Street he passed a west 
bound vehicle several feet before entering the inters.ection. 
for whi·ch ·he dimmed his lights. (T 10) Respondent tes-
tified on cross examination, that he had no recollection of 
anything that happened after he pass.ed the car just before 
the -intersection (T58), and further testified as. follows: 
"After ·passing a car it takes a second or two to regain 
full ·concept of the road ahead, and I guess I just didn't 
have time to look anywhere. (T 11) I didn't remember 
anything until I woke up in the hospital". (T 49) 
The Respondent's vehicle had been struck on the left 
side between the door ·and the/rear fender by one Veri 
Justesen (T 87), who was proceeding south on Second 
West Street when he entered the intersection of Second 
West and Highway U-100, which had been left unprotected 
by defendant's· removal of the STOP s.ign. The pickup 
truf•k was rolled over and the glas1s was broken by the force 
of the impact and the front end of the vehicl~ driven by 
Justes-en was smashed. (T 87) · 
Within a few minutes ·from the time of impact the 
accident · w·as investigated by Fillmore City Poli~e, Merlin 
Hare, and State Trooper Gayle Rasmussen, who testified 
that there was no stop sign in place on the northwest cor-
nel' of th~ intersection wh~ch controlled the traffic co~ng 
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from the north along Second West into U-100. (T 88) 
Officer Hare stated that there was no -co:nStruction 
hor~e or other warning device on the night of the acCident 
where the stop sign had been. Officer Merlin Hare fur-
ther stated that he further investigated the accident the 
next morning and that there was no stop s.ign·and no con.:. 
struction horse at the northwest corner of the intersectiorl 
to control or regulate the traffic. (T 92) 
Gayle Rasmusse·n, State Highway Troo·pe::r, testified· 
that he lives just north of the intersection·· of Second West 
and U-100 and that he also assisted in the inves,tigationof 
the arcident. That on the night of the accident the stop 
sign was down on the ground near a mound of dirt in t~~ 
general area of where it had formerly been set to control 
the traffic. (T 104) He further testified that he s1a'\V no 
construction horses or other s-igns in place on· the riighf.of: 
the accident. Gayle Ras.muss.en further testified . that ·he·· 
passed the intersection frequently going to and from work 
and that the stop sign had been down for several days be-
for~ the accident. (T 109) On cross examination, ·aayle 
Rasmussen was asked "During the week did you· S·ee 'it 
n1m:n on the g-rounrl with your own eyes,?" Trooper Ras-
r.'l.llssen's· answer, "Yes, I did." (T 110) 
Everett Ashman, who lives in the home on the fio·rth-
wrst corner of the intersention, stated "That the stop sign 
was down lying on the ditch bank for apj)roximately a 
wepk during- the latter part of October". (T 79) He fur~ 
ther testified that he didn't recall seeing a co·nstri.rctio:n 
horse or construction sign in the area ; that· on returning · 
home at night after dark in his car he missed the bridge 
or "Ulvert because the stop sign was not there to guide him 
and no other warning in ·its place. (T 79 82) · -·--
Maxim Thornton, employee of the Fillmore· City Street< 
Department. testified thathothstop signs were in p:tace on· 
Second West and First North before the construction woir'k·.-:· 
began. (T 65) That the stop sign ·was :removed ·and:wa~r:~ 
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doVv-:n: ·.most of the ·week before the ·accident. He· further, 
~~tified·: that he· hauled trash past the intersection of Sec-
OJ!d West and u~100 the morning of Saturday, October 29, 
and that the stop sign was down on Saturday morning, 
which was the morning of the accident. (T 68) He further 
testified that there was not any sign or a construction 
horse on the northwest corner of the inters.ection of Second 
West and U-100 for three days past. It is important to 
note that Maxim Thornton testified that he hauled 
tt·a9h in a north-south direction along Second West, Satur-
day ·and h~d· pas:sed the intersection each day previous 
thereto and that he didn't observe any construction horses 
on the intersection corner on October 27, 28 or 29th, 
rr 75) and that the stop sign was down most of that week. 
(T.74) 
·Veri Justesen, who was not a party to the action, but 
who drove his vehicle s:outh along Seeond West into the un-
protected intersection, was not a witness in the case and 
any testimony or statements allegedly made by Veri Juste-
sen is clearly hearsay and inadmi~sible. It is known, how-
ever, that Veri Justesen had res:ided in Delta, Utah and 
not Fillmore, for several years, but the fae:t remains that 
the construction company, - by the admission of its own· 
for~man, testified that the stop sign was remo:ved by them 
eaeh day. Then he prop·ped the stop sign against a construc-
tion horse in the evening. (T 126) But the foreman for the 
defendant construction eornpany testified that the sign was 
down a morning. or two the week of the ae"cident. (T 141) 
And-the foreman further·testified that he s:pent part .of_ his 
time out on the· Holden project (approximately 10 miles 
away), and that the crew moved the ·signs at Second West 
Street and First North Street each· day for several days · 
while Palfreyman, the foreman, was doing construction at 
Holden.. (T 142) · · ·· · 
Eugene Ashby testified that because of the location of 
the liouse of Everett Ashman on the northwest corner of 
the intersection, that one back ·more than 50 feet of the ; 
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5 
cro~s walks west of the intersection would have impair-
ment of vision to the north. ·Everett Ashman testified that 
hi~ house on the northwes·t corner of the ·intersection was· 
set back from the property line approximately 20· feet on 
the south and approximately 25 feet on the e·ast. (T 77) 
This visual obstruction would render the visibility at the 
intersection for both traffc from the north and west im-
paired until they got quite close into the interse'<~tion and 
made the necessity for the stop sign to control the traffic· 
at Se·cond West Street and U-100 the more important and 
ne~Jssary, and with no stop sign or traffic control deVice·:in 
place to keep the traffic from the north to 'the :south coni·;· 
tro1led because of the defendant's negligence in having 
moved the sign, the obvious and easily contetn:rHated result 
occured, a motori.st, Veri Justesen, drov,e into the ungUard~ 
ed intersflction and injured the plaintiff. Inasmuch as the 
Appellant's Brief contains. little or no re.ferert"'e.:to the mat...-
ter of contributing negligence or matter of 'damages .which 
were awarded in the trial court, Respo-rld~nt'-: .. will not in-·· 
elude such matters in Statement of Facts. ,- ' · .. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I ·. 
THE ABSENCE OF THE STOP SIGN WAS : 
THE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION .. ~· 
~ .- r •.. - .~ • • • .•• ·: • - -
With four witnesses, Trooper Gayl~. Ras~~s.~~n,_ Wh:o. 
resides two blocks north of the First· North ·:s~~i>tuFW~s:( 
intersection and who passed the intersecti~~ ·daily -on. h.is · 
wa~· to and from work; Maxim Thornton~ City Roaq Errt~ · 
ployee, who travelled the r0agcJaily.; Ev~rett ~sp~~p, who. 
l'esides on 'the n·orth"\vest cor"ne:r-· of 'the·. intersection 'and_-
who .passed the stop sign. a:r:ea, J!ig-_ht. and .. rodrning .;~ver'y~ 
day: _Merlin.Hare .. Citv Police_ Qffic~r~ _·w}J.o ·1nve'stigated· 
the accid~pt, e{lch. testifyj:p.g tlJ.~t t~~ sJop_ sign- controlihili<; 
the traffic- at ·second West Street and First Nort1fwB:;:de:ffi" 
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down by the defendant construction company while they 
w~re working. daily in the area on curb, gutter and culvert 
replacement, (T 79, 88, 92, 104, 105, 109, 110) leaves no 
doubt that -the Court was justified in finding that the de-
fendant was negligent. And of course on appeal, the review 
must be in light most favorable to the plaintiff unless the 
evidence so viewed ·is so completely contrary to the testi-
mony as to compel findingEl as a matter of law in favor of 
the defendant, the judgment is required to be affirmed. 
The only testimony of the defendant and the only wit-
ness produced by the defendant, namely, the foreman of 
the. construction job, Grant Palfreyman, testified that he 
was·· directing two construction jobs at the same time, onP 
at Fillmore along- U-100 and one at Holden, approximately 
10 miles north ( T 142), and that while he, Grant Palfrey-
man, was working at the Holden job, his crew at Fillmore 
moved the sig-ns at Second West Street and First North 
Street each day for several days. (T 142) That the same 
witness testified- that he knew the stop sign was down a 
morning or two of the week of the accident. (T 141) 
· The negHgence of the defendant company in not 
placing the stop· sign or placing other control devices to 
protect the-travelling motorists at this intersection was the 
prcximate cause of the collision between Veri Justesen who 
drove through the- unguarded inter~ection and into the ve-
hicle· of the plaintiff, who was rightfully and carefully 
travelling U-100. The plaintiff was entirely free of any 
negligent conduct and no contributory negligence is argued 
by ~ppellant. · 
· .·· ·In case of Edmunds v. Germer, 12 Utah 2d 215 364 P. 
2d 1015, this court held defendant negligent in not placing 
sufficient warning signs on an old highway after a new 
section of highway parallel to the old had been- constructed 
artdthatthe constructi-on company was not relieved either 
·under·.-common law or contractual -duty, from adequately 
warning the public by signs or barricades of any dang~r~us 
condition on the old highway. In that case, the plambf:f. 
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Edmunds, drove north from Cedar City on U. S. 91~ passed 
the south junction of the old and new highways, and, us:ing · 
the new road, traveled to a point near the north end of hii 
property. After briefly inspecting his property on the east, 
he drove over the old highway by means of an access road· 
to look at his property on the west side of the old road.· 
Then Edmunds drove the automobile south on the old road 
for approximately one mile when he drove into a drain-age 
cut. The accident occurred between 3 and 4 o'clock in th~L 
afternoon. The weather was clear and the visibility good. 
'fh·~ road was level and unobstructed. How ·much more. neg~· 
li1Pnt was Whiting Haymond Construction Company -in the. 
instant case, when they left a main inters;ec>tion of U..;100·at 
Sec~nd West Street, unprotected by any sign, warning de .. 
vice or barricade? 
The defendant in his Brief attempts to shift the blame• 
to some boys who his witness testified had taken down 
snme of the con~trurtion company signs, and ·a city.·officer·, 
compelled the boys to return them. The.onbf pe.rsonto:testi..;.-
fy regarding this matter was Grant Palfreyman,. ('!':127),. 
who testified that the stop sign which was put up against 
the barricade or construction horse, was missing· Monday 
IDC'rning. (T 127) He also testified that there had been' no . 
strr sign in pla''e or against the barricade one or t\vo other 
mornings of the week of the accident.· (T 141): · Yet,····Mr.:'·. :·. 
Rasmussen of the Highway Patrol, stated: that the st6(t. 
sign, the night of the accident, was lay!ng oil 'th~, ·gtound:· 
near a mound of dirt where the construction work~ was·.· 
p-oin~ on. (T 104) That it had been d'own for s.evetaLdays-.~­
('1, 105, 109, 110) And that he saw no construction horses:.· 
or other barricade the night of the accident. Everett· Ash,. 
man. residing on the ·northwest corner of the·. intersecti<tn:. . 
stated t}1at the stop sigTI_ was down~·'laying··on a-'dit:ch·:bank'.: 
and had ·been for approximately a··· week· (T 79) ~:-a1td~tliat:: 
he didn•t _see' a construction::·nors~ ·o't \barrieada:~fT·::·~{})-:-~ 
That there ·was· a ·construction sign· pu't--up later:· (T: ~sJ} .. 
Officer :Merlin~ Hare· stated that-.he>.saw·:neither: const:tu~t-:: 
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tion horses, nor sign the night of the accident, nor the next 
morning when he further investigated. (T 88) Maxim 
Thornton, City Road Employee, testified that the stop sign 
had been down most of the week before the accident, 
(T 67), and that on Saturday morning, the day of the ac-
cident, when he passed this intersection going in a nortr.-
south direction, there was not a construction horse. (T 71) 
It is pointed out that Halloween is the night of Octo-
ber 31st, Monday, and the accident occurred October 29th 
Saturday. ·If there was any molesting of any signs, it 
would., in all probability, be on Halloween, but at any rate 
the testimony of Pafreyman is overcome by the testimony 
of the other four witnesses who testified that the sign was 
actually on the ground and that there was no construction 
horse in place for it to be leaned against. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT-NEGLIGENCE WAS 
PROXIMATE CAUSE 
The ·defendant was negligent and there was no inter-
vening act of a third person which became a superseding 
cause of the harm to the plaintiff preventing the actions of 
the defendant from being a contributing proximate cause 
of !he accident and the accompanying injuries. This Court 
has spoken forcibly upon this matter in a case very similar 
in fact. 
Nyman v. Cedar City 12 Utah 2d 45 361 P.2d 1114. In 
that case; on Center Street in Ced.ar City, which is a main-
traveled, east-west street, hardsurfaced, 25 feet in width. 
The city, in connection with installing curb and gutter, had 
]eft a bank of dirt about two feet high and about four or 
five feet wide along the north edge of the surfacing in the 
100 to 200 east bl~k, and some blocks of concrete had been 
dug up and. were left lying in the dirt. A culvert lay gener-
ally parallel to and in the row of dirt; about 40 feet from 
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the east end thereof the culvert protruded ·about a foot ·be-·; 
yond the dirt into the- surfaced portion ·of the highway:;,.-
about fifteen feet west a block of concrete .similarly pro--
ject.ed about a foot or two beyond the south side of the dirt 
onto the highway,. and about 20 feet further west ·still 
ar,other did so. There were no barricades or warning signs 
or lights to warn traffic of the obstructions mentioned. :-
About midnight on May 18, 1958, one Ivan Walton; Jr .. 
driver of a Model T Ford automobile, with his wife and the· 
plaintiff and. her husband got in the car; men"!n . front, ... 
ladies in the rear, and started for a cafe iri Cedar Cariyou-· 
east of town. Mr. Walton, while driving at a moderate. :-
speed, came upon the bank of dirt, and as the trial court· 
found, the car struck the south edge of the windrow·. near 
it' easterly end, skirted the edge of the windrow _and the .. 
front wheel or axle struck the end of the culvert. The car 
continued onward along the . edge of the windrow and 
stru;k the second concrete block with such force as to cause 
the three passengers to be thrown from tlie'·Vehicle. Quot-
ing from that case on page48: 
The trial judge, with commendable judicial.:zeal, 
prepared a memorandum decision in. which .. · he- set. 
forth a clear and complete determination of the facts 
as he viewed them, together with a lucid- and accurate : 
exposition of the principle-s. of law applicable. thereto.·-: 
He made separate findings on each of the ~City's eon-~-- . 
tentions: that the headlights and brakes of.. the ancient . 
automobile were not up to standard; thaf it ·was 11of ·· 
licensed for use upon the highways: and that the· p~u·- .·· 
ties, including the driver, had been drinking. H6wever, 
he found expressly that none of:_ these factors proxi;. 
mately caused the accident; and that the plaintiff wa~ .·. _ 
not guilty of any negligence which contributed. as .a 
proximate cause thereto. He did find that Mr. Walto:rt 
was negligent but held that it- wa,s only a concunJng:: 
proxirpite cause of the ai\Cident, and that the '·'aC.Cidelit · .. 
would not have happened-but:for.the•coricurr€nt:hegl1~>r 
gence of the defendant cjty;" .Ue also· corre.ctly r-uled.'7-
that the. negligence· o! ~he .--l}~s~. :~riye~_ :vyas 119~~ -.~~ :pu~~ 
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- ~ able to th~ :Ph;tintiff as guest passenger, and that.not~ 
-witll.stanqing his negligence she could recover .. from 
'another tort-fe-asor whose neligence concurred to cause 
her :injury~lt has long been accepted in this- jurisdic-
tion that a city is require& to exercise reasonable care 
to·keep.its streets in safErcondttion, -and that it may 
be held liable for injuries proximately resulting from 
its failure to do so. 
Quoting further from Nyman v. Cedar City on Page 
50;-the. quote states: 
·;.But -a ·different principle applies if the later actor 
· (the· driver Walton),- even though acting negligently, 
did not beco~e aware of the danger until too late to 
, avoid striking the obstruction. After, getting into such 
· an emergency situation, his action in driving into the 
obstruction could be regarded as acting in combination 
. with the .prior negligence of the city as a concurri-ng 
. ·· pro:xiroate cause of the accident. In that event his act 
, would not. be the sole proximate cause. It is reasoned 
. that 'this .is so hecause the condition of danger created 
· by the- city is such that it could reasonably be antici-
pated that travelers on the street, negligent or other-
. ·.wise,. may . not observe the dangerous condition until 
-too late .. to··. avoid it. Therefore, an accident· of· the 
character here under· consideration might be expected 
tO follow as a natural consequence of the dangerous 
condition ·previously created, and consequently may be 
·. deemed· to· be proximately caused by it. The evidence 
, here ·is reasonably susceptible of the view that the 
. "".-driver was :unable to see the obstruction until too late 
_. to avoid it. In fact, that is the import of the plain-
.· tiff's ' evidence and the theory upon which the trial 
'court rendered its judgment. ·Accordingly, the find-
ing must be sustained. 
The. ·only purpose for the State Road Commission or 
other' legal ·.agencies to provide· and maintain .stop signs, 
sema~hores, ,warning. signals or . other traffic . control. de-
vices,· is to . warn the."> traveling public and .. :control ·their 
driving·,actions. It is absurd for the defendant to state· 
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11·' 
in his Brief on Page ·g thereof that "If the stop sign 'had 
been up, it would not have given Justesen any'more w~rn­
ing of the highway or of the plaintiff's vehicle than he 
already had." Justesen never even testified and there:can 
be no supposition drawn from hearsay as to· .wbat he, ob-
served or what he did not observe at the i:ritersEfutiori as 
he approached it from a northerly direction (>ri-'·tlie 'bight 
of October 29th, or what knowledge he .may:·.hav-e- had or 
may not have had or remember or did not~rem~~ber.:·.~9J?.ti:9 
cerning construction work being conducted by the aefend-
ant in the area of Second West Street --and -U-100. The 
fncts are certain that there was no stop slgn, '·Warning 
sign, barricade or other control device to prbte·ct -or gfrect 
or control the motoring public. That a stop sign is put in 
place near the edge of the road approximately 20 feet back 
from the cross walks and would be more than 100 feet back 
from the center of the intersection to protect·and control 
the flow of traffic into the intersection. ·verl· Justesen, 
or any other motoris·t, traveling south • on Second · West 
Street, had a stop sign been in place, would have 0nserved 
the sign more than 200 feet before reaching' the· sign, could 
have and would have brought his vehicle to such s.peed _and 
traveling conditions as would permit him to ~stop _hi the 
loeation of the stop sign, instead ·of traveling_ to an. area 
passed where the stop sign was required to: he bef{?re there 
was a showing of break marks or s.kid marks·· where it 
was too late for the driver to avoid collidin'g with the 
passing motorist, who had the right-of-way ·and ·who had 
the right to believe that there was a stop.sign in place 
ou Second West, and that- the driver on Second- West 
would obey the traffic control. - - - -· - . - - -- · .... - · 
Counsel for the defendant· has cited -several cases- in 
his Brief contending that they support the propositiQn that~ -
the actiQn,s -of the. defendant . in this _action were not .. negii.;.: -· 
gent, proximately contributing to the. acCident~ An exam.; ·-
ination of the . facts of the cases~- cited clearly: :show·-Jthat :._;_ 
there is a fact situation entirely different from that of the 
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in~t~Jl't ;;_ ca~e/:Rieh~rd · E. Ashby v; Whiting & Ha;ymond. 
The defendant; in: citing such cases; points out an interven. 
ing~ -act ~of a.· lhird :person commftted -in such manner ,as to 
m3;ke it a superseding cause of harm to the third .. party 
and· _there are· 111any cases where the intervening act can 
and does become a superseding cause~ but a careful analy-
sjs of the law pn causation and proximate cause will clear-
ly' .. ~eveai that 1n the instant case of Rfchard E. Ashby v. 
Whiting &: Raymond Construction Company, with the con-
tirluin:g: neiHience of the defendant, antidating and con-
cttr-ring· wi.th the negligent act of the third party, Veri 
J u'staseil:,- made the actions of the defendant actor proxim-
ate caus;e and him a joint tort feasor. 
·· · A statement of the law on negligence of intervening 
acts directly applicable to the fact situation in the instant 
case is contained in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 
Vol. II Section 447' Page 1196. We quote the following: 
. . The fact that an intervening act of a third person 
. is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent manner 
· _ does not make it a superseding cause of harm to an-
.· other which the actor's negligent conduct is a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about, if 
(a) the actor at ·the time of his negligent conduct 
should have realized that a third person might 
so act, or (b) a· reasonable man knowing the situation . existing-
.-when the act of the third person was done would 
not regard it as · highly extraordinary that the 
third person had so acted, or 
(c) the .· intervening act is a normal res.ponse to a 
situation created by the actor's conduct ·and the 
manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily 
negligent. 
Conlment on Clause (a): · 
. a,. The ~tatement in Clause (a) applies where 
f :tli~te .-is ·a ·realizable:· Hkelinood of such act but the 
y likelihood is not .-enough iri "itself to make the actor's 
. -"conduct negligent, the·coridp.ct being negligent because 
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of other and greater risks which it entails. If the 
realizable likelihood that a third person will act in the 
negligent manner in which a particular third person 
acts is so great as to be the risk or even one of the 
risks which make the actor's conduct unreasonably 
dangerous and therefore negligent, the case is gov-
erned by the rule stated in 449. 
There was a realizable likelihood when the defendant 
left the stop sign down and the intersection with U-100 
and Second West Street unguarded and uncontrolled by 
warning signs or barricade, that a third person will act 
in such manner as to negligently or otherwise drive into 
tho unprotected and uncontrolled and unguarded intersec-
tion. The only purpose for having stop signs is to prevent 
surh condition. Quoting now from Res,tatement of -the 
Law of Torts, Vol. II, Section 449, Page 1202, the law is 
stated as follows: 
If the realizable likelihood that a third-- person 
may act in a particular manner is the hazard· or one 
of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such 
an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tor-
tious or criminal does not prevent the actor. from ·be-
ing liable for harm caused thereby. 
Comment: 
a. The happening of the very event the likeli-
hood of which makes the actor's conduct_ n~gligent 
and so subjects the actor to liability, cannot___relieve 
him from liability. The duty to refrain from the act 
committed or to do the act omitted is imposed to pro-
tect the other from this very danger. To· deny r~cov­
ery because the other's exposure to the very risk, 
from which it was the purpose ·of the duty _to protect 
him, resulted in harm to him, would be to deprive 
the .other of all protection and to. make the .. <luty a 
nullity. · · - · · · · · - · · ·· 
To further establish that there_ was no intervening act 
!n the instant case constituting a superseding cause -of 
harm, the rule on .intervening force as contai:Q.ed in.Jhe_Re-
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s~_~a~~~nt of_ the_· Law of Torts, Vol. II~· Section 443, Page 
ll8~1squoted: . ·.· · 
. . An intervening act of .a hutrtan being or a~imal 
which is a normal response to the stimulus of a situa-
. tion cre3:ted by the actor's negligent conduct, is n9t a 
superseding cause of harm to another which the ac-
tor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about. 
. Comment.: · 
· · ·a. . The_ • rule stated in this Section applie·s not 
only .~o a~~s done by the person who is harme~d or by 
a third person as a normal response to the situation 
created by the defendant's negligence, but also to acts 
of animals reacting thereto in a manner normal to 
them. It is not necessary that an act which is done 
by the person harmed or by a third person should be 
"reasonable"; that is, that the act should be one which 
a·· reasonable man would regard as not involving an 
·unreasonable risk to himself or others. It is enough· 
· thatthe act ·is a normal response to the stimulus of 
the situation created by the actor's negligence. 
The act of the third person, in this case, Veri Juste--
sen, though neglig£:mt, was only a concurring cause and the 
defendant actor's negligence was still actively operating 
and contributing as proximate cause to the harm of the 
plaintiff. The law on this matter is contained in the Re-
statement of the Law of Torts, Sections 439-440-441, Page 
1184, part of which is hereby quoted: 
Section 439. If the effects of the actor's negli-
gent conduct actively and continuously operate. to 
bring about harm to another, the fact that the active 
and substantially simultaneous operation of the effects 
of a third person's innocent, tortious or criminal act 
is also a substantial factor in bringing about the 
,Parm does not protect the actor from liability. 
Comment: .. .. .· . 
: ·a·,' Although in the_ great majority~ of cases to 
which ·• the ·rule ·stated in this. Section is. applicable, the 
effects of the conduct of both the actor and the third · 
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pers·on are in simultaneous active operation, it -is not 
necessary that their operations shall . be absolutely 
simultaneous. It is enough that the two are hi sub-
stantially simultaneous operation, as when the effect 
of the conduct of one or the other has ceased its active 
operation immediately before the other's conduct takes 
active effect in harm to the other. 
b. If the harm is brought about by the substan-
tially simultaneous and active operation of the effects 
of both the actor's negligent conduct and of an act of 
a third person which is wrongful towards the other 
who is harmerl, the conduct of each is a cause of the 
harm, and both the actor and the third person are 
liable. 
'fhe act of Veri Justesen in the instant case was not 
nn independent force not stimulated by a ·situation created 
l)y the actor's conduct and a~cordingly, cannot be regarded 
a~ i!ldividual and intervening. Quoting from Restatement 
of the Law of Torts, Vol II, Section 441, Page 1187, Com-
ment a, the law is stated as follows:· · · · - · 
The active operation of an intervening force -may 
or may not be a superseding cause which relieves the 
actor from liB.bility for another's harm occurring 
thereafter. Whether it has this effect is determined 
by the rules stated in 442 to 453. A force due to an. 
act of a third person which is wrongful towards. the 
other who is harmed may be only a contributory fac-
tor in producing the harm. If so, both the actor and -
the third person are concurrently liable. This is so, 
although the actor's conduct has ceased to operate ac-
tively and has merely created a condition which is 
made harmful by the operation of the intervening 
force set in motion by the third person's negligent or 
otherwise wrongful conduct. -
In the in~tant case, the Court had·: the op~rtU:riity of 
hearing the testimony, examining the facts and listel).ing 
to the witnesses· and· could.- then determine f~om~-the·.cir­
cumc;tances the likelihood of the defendant's neglig~nt-con-
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dU;ctin bringing ~harm to the plaintiff by stimulating the 
a~t pf the thir_~ party, Justesen. -: The Restatement of the 
L~w-'nf_Tqrt~~ Yo!. II, __ Section 433, ~ages 1165 and f166 is 
quoted as follows: · . _ .. . · · ·· ·· 
· ~drinsiderati6ns impO.;t~rif in determining,whether 
negligent conduct is a substantial factor in pi·oducing 
,harm.., . ,, . .. 
· 'fhe fpUo·wing considerations are in themselves 
, ()( in. ~ombipation with one another important in de-
te:rnunrng.:whether the actor's conduct is a substantial 
{aGtQ:r:-in ;:})ringing about harm to another: 
. (a)~- the number of other factors which contribute in 
· · . prpducing the harm and the extent of the effect 
G . . '\vhich they have in producing it; 
(b) whether after the event and looking back from 
the harm to the actor's negligent conduct it an-
' pe~:r:s highly extraordinary that it should have 
brought about the harm; 
,, -.(c) )v4ether the actor's conduct has created a force 
; "or sedes '·of forces which are in continuous and 
'\''active operation up to the time of the harm, or 
has ':created a situation harmle~.s unless acted 
upon by other forces for which the actor is not 
responsible. 
The comment on Clause (b) is important to the cir-
cumstan,es in the instant case. We quote fr<'m Page 1167, 
Volume II of the Restatement of the Law of Torts: 
~Viewing the accident after the event. A result of 
the actor's tortious conduct may be one which, either 
in its extent or the manner in which or the sequence 
of· events through which the conduct operates to bring 
about the harm, is altogether different from the re-
'sult which the actor at the time of his negligence re-
cognized or should have recognized as likely to result 
· · ·· therefrom. None the 'less, after the event, such a re-
. suit may not appear to _the court or jury to be so high-
. lv· extraordinary as to prevent the actor's ~onduct 
from being a substantial factor in bri.:p.gfrig)t about. 
What the actor does or :should expet~t ·. depends upon 
. -''the' circumstances whi.ch h_e knows. or ·should _know and . 
his forecast jn the light of these circumstances as to 
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what is likely to happen. The court's judgment, as to 
whether the harm is a normal or highly extraordinary 
result, is made after the event with the full knowledge 
of all that has happened. This includes those sur-
roundings of which at the time the actor knew noth-
ing but which the course of events discloses to the 
court. 
The trial court, in its findings, found under No. 4 
that the employees and agents of the defendant. should 
have reasonably foreseen that persons driving vehicles 
~outh on Second West Street and into_ the intersection of 
Fir~t North Street, would not stop or proceed with the 
usual caution engendered by a STOP. sign in place for traf-
fic control at such corner, and that the defendant was neg-
Hgent in not replacing and maintaining· such STOP sign 
or 'lther appropriate traffic control device cat this inter-
se:tion after they had removed the STOP: sign:.~nd, _knew 
that it was so .removed. The defendant's such negligence 
proximately contributed to cause the collision;· which in 
fa"t resulted, and consequently, the defendant's -such negli-
gence caused and contributed to the ph.~.inti!f's injuries 
Rnd damages complained of in hi~ eomplaint~ ~ · ·· 
In the light of all of the testimony, the, .supporting 
<''l"t>S ar.d the substantive law, and with the ·requirement 
thai- on appeal the court is required to review the matter·. 
in the light most favorable to· the plaintiff, there ·ts noth-
ing presented by the defendant's Brief to change~the rul-
ing of the trial court. In the Haarstrich . v. Oregon-· Short 
Line case 70 Utah 552, 262 Pac. 100,-- (Utah 1927) ; the 
ras~~ of Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co. 1 Utah 2d 14R, 
260 P. 2d 287 (Utah 19'53); the case of Toma v. Utah 
Power and Light Co. 12 Utah 2cl. '278, ·365 P. 2d 788,-and 
Velasquez v. Greyhound Lines,· 12· Utah 2d 379, 366 P. 2d 
989. each of the fact situations are entirely different from 
the instant case. In the Toma - Utah Power and Light 
c~.tse. the Utah Power and Light Company merely contin-
ued to have power continuing through their lines and the 
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~f"Ountain '~tates ·.Construction -Com_pany had knowledge 
that Utal). Power -and Light had ·refused to cut it off. 
Tl~ere was_ nq continuing negligence: ·against Utah Power 
and Light as there is against Whiting Haymond Construe-. 
ti():Il (Jm:npany in the instant case. In the Velasquez v. 
Greyhound Lines case, it appears from the court decision 
and the facts that the driver of the semi-trailer was never 
neg~ig'Emt to the point of being proximate cause, but that 
the Greyhound Bus Company, as the Whiting Haymond 
Company, was guilty of negligence proximately contribut-
ing to tpe- accident. In the Haarstrich v. Oregon Short 
Line ease, the facts showed that it was doubtful that there 
was any negligence on the part of the railroad in the oper-
ation of their lights and if so, it had nothing to do with 
the accident. In the instant case the removal of the STOP 
sign by the defendant company was definitely negligent. 
It: precipitated and stimulated the negligent act of the 
third party, Justesen, and the concurring negligence of 
both caused the-injuries to the plaintiff. 
< 'The -case at Bar is more nearly in line with the later 
Supreme Court Case, Nyman v. Cedar City, Supra. 
As to the cases which the defendant quotes relating 
to past and future existence of a fact or condition, we have 
no quarrel· whatsoever with the decision in those cases, 
but· the fact situation of the instant cas-e does not require 
the proof· of a present condition or state of facts at a 
g1ven time as being a presumption that the same condition 
or facts existed at a prior date. In the instant rase. 
Tronper Gayle Rasmussen testified that the STOP sign 
had remained down for several days prior to the accident 
(T 105), and -in answer to the defense counsel's cross 
examination: "During that week did you see it down on 
the ground with your own eyes", the answer was: "Yes, 
I did"~ City Employee, Maxim Thornton hauled trash 
passed thearea where the STOP sign was supposed to be 
on -the morning of the accident. He testified that there 
was not a STOP sign or a construction hors,e (T 71). He 
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passed the area in his work daily and stated that the 
STOP sign had been down most of the week before the 
accirtent. (T 67) Everett Ashman, property owner on the 
northwest corner of the intersection stated that the STOP 
~ign was down laying on the ditch bank for approximately 
n week during the last week in October (T 79). The STOP 
sip;n was down on the ground the night of the accident, ac-
cnrding to Trooper Rasmussen. (T 109, 110) We are not 
required to make any presumption when we have dire·ct 
te8timony that the STOP sign was down at the time of the 
accident and had remained down according to three differ-
ent witnesses for several days prior thereto. Maxim 
Thornton specifically stating that on October 27, 28 and 
29th the STOP sign was down. (T 75 ) . 
Under the abundance of evidence, there is no question 
but what defendant Whiting Haymond Construction Com-
pany was negligent. That the negligence proximately con-
tributed to the a"cident and that they were a contributing 
tPrt feasor with Veri Justesen, and the rule of negligence· 
cited in American Juris prudence, Vol. 38, Page 726, Sec. 
69 i::: as follows : 
The general rule is that whoever ·acts negligently-
is answerable for all the consequences that may ensu2 
in the ordinary course of events, even tho:ugh such 
consequences are immediately and directly .. brought 
about by an intervening cause, if such intervenhig 
cause was set in motion by the original wrongdoer.· 
An intervening cause does not operate~ to . exempt. 
a defendant from liability under a wrongful. death 
statute, if that cause is put into operation -by the de:-
fendant's wrongful act. One who is responsible for 
disorder in a crowdis liable for injuries suffered by a 
member of the crowd as a consequence of the disor-
derly acts. · 
As to contributing tort · feasors, the Restatement of 
the Law of Torts, Vol. 4, Page 875 provides that "Each of 
2 or more persons whose tortious conduct. is. a 'legal causp 
of a harm to another, is liable to the other for the- entire 
harm". . . 
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CONCLUSION 
The employees and agents of the defendant removed 
the STOP sign at Second West and U-100 while they were 
in the process of doing construction work. That they left 
it down for several days prior to the accident and the day 
of the accident. That it was laying in the general area 
on the ground and seen by several witnesses. The em-
ployees and agents or the defendant should have reason-
ably foreseen that persons driving vehicles south along 
Second West Street into the intersection of U-100 would 
not proceed with the caution engendered by a STOP sign 
in place on the northwest corner of the intersection for 
traffic controi. That the absence of the STOP sign, leav-
ing an unguarded intersection, it was natural and fore-
seeable that a collision would and could occur. The de-
fendant's negligence proximately contributed to the causP 
of the collision and to the plaintiff's injuries. The judg-
ment of the lower court should be affirmed. To reason 
oth(:'rwise would be to say that traffic control signals are 
unnecessary and useless and to remove them or obliterate 
them is a harmless act. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
ELDON A. ELIASON 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
